Friday, November 27, 2015

From the Commander, TENTH Fleet strategic plan


For those who depend on us, we will always deliver what we say we deliver.

For those on whom we depend, we will always be clear and exact in communicating our needs.

Words have meaning.  We're missing the mark by a wide margin in both cases above.


ndrker said...

There is no doubt about the daily effort and achievement of our personnel The consistent applicability and connectivity of those same efforts and achievements to COCOMs, (other) Numbered Fleets, and lower echelons is a tougher question.

1810 CDR said...


Anonymous said...

The daily effort and achievement of 10th Fleet personnel is laughable. Not because the deckplate folks who want to work are incompetent but their leadership is.. These Captains who fancy themselves as "leaders" are a sham who can't make a decision to save their life, afraid of their own shadow, know nothing about Cyber or SIGINT and are a laughing stock. Then you have the retired Captains who may be even worse as they continue to hinder progress and keep funding/contracts flowing to their "good ol boy network" of other retired Captains who work for companies that produce squat. The command is an absolute embarrassment.

Anonymous said...

They can't even get fitreps out in time and we expect them to defend our networks in a timely fashion.

Anonymous said...

The command's most substantive problem stems from the fact that it started out over tasked and under manned. This condition still exists.

You can't take deliberate aim at the 50m target if you are engaged in a constant 5m running gunfight.

ndrker said...

'Overtasked and undermanned' is not a barrier to success; it's an excuse. Observe what Sailors do elsewhere while overtasked and undermanned. C10F personnel don't understand the Navy and how it works (no recent Fleet experience). The C10F staff is oblivious or willfully disregards what is going on outside of DC and doesn't know how to plug in to provide value. Even if they did know how, plugging in is the least of that staff's priority. The problem is endemic from the Commander on down. It isn't the "fault" of the staff (they're good people), it's a product of the IW community (leadership). C10F PIM avoids the difficulty of producing real value outside of C10F and leads to comfortable, resource-producing cyber. The community's value in the Fleet today is arguably lower than it's been in a long time. On the brighter side, this is the mean lower low water level and the future will be better (for the Fleet, anyway). It's a matter of which community makes the improvements - IDC type or URL - and when.

Kevin Cooley said...

I spent nearly five years as the Executive Director at FCC/C10F. My experience was that the overwhelming majority of staff officers and civilians at C10F were truly dedicated to and concerned with both the operations of peer Fleets as well as for operations conducted by C10F - including the Commander. Keeping operating the capabilities (C2, BMD, Strike, ISR, etc.) that are dependent on radio and network communications is of real value outside of C10F; at least that is what I heard from the Commanders that I talked with. SIGNIT and IO operations conducted by C10F units are of value outside of C10F. It is very easy to sling mud anonymously at the Commander and her staff, but is both harder and more valuable to offer thoughtful suggestions for improvement.

Anonymous said...

Okay, Mr. Cooley.

Start with a review of the FCC/10FLT MF&T. Make recommendations for its revision. Not aware anything has been done since NAVIDFOR stood up. Define "central operational authority" because it isn't in DoD or Navy terminology. Don't know what it means. Don't disagree that support is/can be provided to forces afloat and ashore, but central operational authority neither make sense nor belongs entirely to FCC/10FLT.

Cryptology, IO and EW should be led by the Fleet staffs. Don't understand how it changed when CNSG went away. People can complain about living in days past but Fleet processes that existed worked. Part of the problem is the down-sizing and a bit of greening of the staffs, but that's happening everywhere. (Detailers can help with this.) Another part of the problem is a seemingly automatic deferral by the Fleet to FCC/10FLT. It needs to stop. FCC/10FLT can provide SME support but the shots need to be called by the Fleet. In some cases, that means NAVIDFOR assumes responsibility for the processes.

Then there is the TYCOM issue. It's hard. It is not the best hand dealt by the Navy, but it needs to work. Get over blanket ADCON to one and OPCON to the other. It doesn't work for all support areas. DIRSUP is not in support of FCC/10FLT; it's in support of deployed commanders. Getting trained Sailors to the units and providing the equipment capabilities is a TYCOM function. Augmentees supporting a deployed staff are OPCON/chopped to that commander. Granted, there are blurred lines when the augmentees are back at the NIOCs and supporting PIII or whomever, but even that is an MT&E function. I can see cyber units, and possibly NCTAMSs/NCTSs being chopped to FCC/10FLT on a persistent basis.

I recall a document that included VADM Dorsett's vision for FCC/10FLT to be lean and mean focusing entirely on operations. Then, pens were put to paper and functions at NAVCYBERFOR were aligned to FCC/10FLT, which included TYCOM functions. In my opinion, this was a move by some to regain an NSG-like organization and/or to move the functions to Ft Meade based on personalities there.

Believe it or not, NAVNETWARCOM/NAVCYBERFOR was beginning to work as a hybrid TYCOM that had operational responsibilities, but someone had a better idea. The TYCOM under USFF and supporting PACFLT is in a better position to support Fleet requirements. There needs to be another review and not one done in a short period of time to satisfy a self-imposed deadline. The Navy needs to get this right. It's working for now because, as you said, there are professionals doing the right things despite alignments and parochialisms at various levels of leadership (my opinion). But it can't last forever because many of the heroes in this won't be around forever, and some will be leaving sooner rather than later. Without the clean alignment of responsibilities and the accompanying resources (including position/people assignments), this whole thing is going to continue to limp along.

CNSG is gone. It's unfortunate but it's the way it is. But, as I said above, there were great processes associated with Fleet cryptology that worked and need to be considered again. The people who were there know those processes and they need to be involved in developing the recommendations for changes that will assure success. NAVIDFOR as the TYCOM is here, for now, and has clear responsibilities that must be recognized, supported (resourced) and employed. Leadership has a role because nothing can be done without their support and approval.

As for identifying myself, not happening. There's a difference between whiners/trolls who remain anonymous and people in the know who could make a difference but don't feel the need for recognition. Let's just get it right, whatever it becomes.

ndrker said...

Part I:
C10F personnel are dedicated to peer Fleet operations- that's not the issue. It's a matter of priorities and experience. Senior CAPTs do not have sufficient fleet experience. Career tracks do not support it, particularly IW, METOC, and INTEL. Even if officers are "lucky" enough to be forced into one of the handful of billets at USFFC or CPF, it is almost ALWAYS in N2/39. What the hell good does that do?! We have officers working to produce intel products for what purpose(?). How is it relevant to USFFC/CPF? Why aren't we elsewhere in these staffs, facilitating solutions and informing/influencing the other Flag officers (the N7, the N3, the N4, etc)? The answer: because we don't know where we should be, what we should be doing, or how things get done. We should have our people in the N8, the N42, the N3. Senior leadership is content to ride it out until it's time leave what is now a disassociated Fleet staff tour for the IDC. Not plugged in to provide value.

--There is value in what C10F does (for the Fleet). But let's be honest here - it isn't exclusive. The radio/network communications, IO/SIGINT, etc were being done before C10F. C10F didn't produce that value. It was simply transferred from other locations to C10F. The added value of C10F can't be found on the waterfront, where the degradation continues (particularly for IW/Intel/IP) unchecked. IO and SIGINT are of value outside of C10F, but again, it was happening prior to C10F. The quality of IO and SIGINT is far below what it used to be. Does anyone know that up until last week XQ for CTF-51 consisted of a LT, two IO planners, and one CND person??? Anyone who has done that job correctly knows how ridiculous that is. It's ok for C10F to let IO go, and why don't they? SIGINT is slightly better off than IO, owing to deeper roots between two IDC communities. Where are the remoted operations, what is needed to force the FIOC to produce for the deployed Commander in concert with the deployed CRC/N2's guidance? How does the FIOC effort (product) find its way under the C2 of the deployed Commander - why doesn't it - why isn't the FIOC chopped to an operational Commander in theater? Just two years ago the CTF NIOCs were surprised to learn they needed to have a FIOC and that it should be capable of executing certain NMETs. Again, Not plugged in correctly. If FIOCs/remoting are to be successful, we have to rid ourselves of the misunderstanding that P2 bodies work in the interests of anyone other than those deployed forward. Thus, all OPCON direction comes from those SUPPORTED folks (the deployed commander) and all ADCON is IDFOR.

ndrker said...

Part II:
--If C10F wants to put some skin in the operational game (other than cyber), they are free to go ahead and task the FIOC folks and deployed DISUPers with a C10F mission. I'm pretty sure they can push an OPORD listing what they want to accomplish (on a not interfere basis). Maybe they do this already, but I haven't personally seen it.

--In the end, it's not about dedication, intelligence, or desire; every single soul at C10F has plenty. Success is found in value efficiently and effectively generated. What is lacking is sufficient competence in the processes, personalities, and functions in the places C10F must affect to generate value for the Navy. It is very difficult to be competent without the background and experience to understand the way things work, the local staff processes, how things get done, how things get killed.

The specific recommendations should be relatively easy for one to infer, but just in case (at the COM level):
1) Understand everyone lies to Flag Officers. Things are not as healthy as they are described. Listen to the people who do not need your signature.
2) Presence matters. Put people and staff functions in those places closest to the problems they must solve to achieve success.
3) Invest appropriately in the Fleet staffs, both ashore and afloat(we aren't right now).
3) Disperse IW/INTEL officers from the N2 at CPF/USFFC and empower them to influence the Fleet as a Naval officer who happens to be IDC. This will also build the types of leaders needed at a place like C10F. be creative here.
4) Fix the FIOCs and P2 alignment. Make them OPCON to the deployed Commander (and OPCON to C10F, should C10F decide they have a non-cyber mission they want executed).
5) Fix or give away IO (and all associated billets) to some place in the fleet where it can be fixed. Best option is to give it away, that way it won't conflict with other C10F priorities (one of the reasons it is broken today).
6) Always remember C10F is an organization, not a community. Strive to maintain the difference between the two. This has led down a dark path - In SIGINT/IO/Cyber/EW, C10F cannot get better without the IW community getting better, and the IW community cannot (currently) get better without C10F concurrence. The IDC and community reputations are excessively leveraged against one organization.

CDR G. James said...

Great comments and on the mark. It's a mess. Senior leadership seems to be okay with that.

Anonymous said...

From Anonymous, December 21, 2015 at 10:11 AM

As a follow-up, I saw a document that is believed to be the current draft of the FCC/10FLT MF&T.

It's too long (39 pages), it's too detailed, it continues to use non-standard terminology, it retains responsibilities for which the command is not the best athlete, it misrepresents, and it puts a lot of words toward the relationship with NAVIDFOR.

- The forwarding instruction is about 12 pages long and the two enclosures for FCC and 10FLT functions, respectively, make up the remain 27 pages. USFF's MF&T is about 12 pages and PACFLT's MF&T is about 10 pages. Could take a machete to the FCC and 10FLT functions.
- FCC continues to be designated the “central operational authority” for Navy networks, intelligence, cryptology/SIGINT, IO, cyber, EW and space. Central operational authority needs to be defined. It isn’t a DoD or Navy term. Putting it in quotes gives it less credibility.
- If central operational authority means being in charge, FCC/10FLT is not in the best position to lead Fleet cryptology, IO and EW. Give them to the Fleet commanders or the ID TYCOM. FCC/10FLT certainly is not the lead for general intelligence.
- FCC is incorrectly identified as the executive agent for EW (data and reprogrammable library development). OPNAVINST 3430.23C directs FCC/10FLT to designate and resource and executive agent for EW data and library development. Although it may be considered a small point by some, there is a difference and it speaks to the overall development of the MF&T.
- For an OPNAVINST, too much detail on the relationship with NAVIDFOR. Put it in a message like ONI did if there needs to be that much discussion. Although ONI's messages four sections long and included guidance such as, "Policy differences will be resolved at the lowest level to the greatest extent possible. If required, disagreements will be collegially referred up each respective chain of command until agreement can be reached." Really? USFF and NAVIDFOR must have a chop on the draft MF&T.

This MF&T is a significant opportunity to refine and define FCC/10FLT as a lean and mean organization focused on cyber, networks and SIGINT. Instead, it dwells on rationalizing its existence as the status quo.

Anonymous said...

Why is it that our billets at SURFOR are not our community's best and brightest? Why does the surface TYCOM have only a LT billet? We need to be sending a post-sea duty Commander to that staff. Officers with recent fleet experience! Our representation at surfor is laughable.

Kevin Cooley said...

It is great to see some specific suggestions for improvement being put on the table here. For those of you that remain in the Navy, I encourage you to share your insights with your chain of command. My experience with The FCC/C10F Commander is that she is both very open to input and interested in how to improve.

I think that a part of the friction (perhaps as evidenced by the issue around central operating authority) centers around the fact that the lack of geographic boundaries and the extreme time compression associated with cyberspace operations are dissimilar from more tradition warfare domains and this in turn creates a misfit in terms of applying our traditional geographically oriented command structures. Warfare in cyberspace does not honor command areas of operation and actions in part of the globe instantly and materially impact other geographically removed areas in ways that more traditional warfare operations do not. Real operational experience over the last three years puts an emphasis on this point. This reality creates the need for a command (in cyberspace) with a global area of operation and the command structure and doctrine is strained to reconcile this with the real imperative for geographically focused commands in other domains. I agree that definitions and doctrine remain too fuzzy and that perhaps a term better than "central operating authority" will emerge through both the hard experience of real operations (both in and out of cyberspace) and through the continued intellectual dialog.

Part of what I hope will emerge is alignment of the Navy Cyber Forces as a TCYOM under FCC as a peer command to C10F. I always thought that this would simplify the OPCON/ADCON issues while enabling C10F to focus most exclusively on operations. This was not the decision made and as has been remarked here, the respective staffs are working hard to deal with the hand they have been dealt. Perhaps there will be an opportunity to revisit this issue in a year or two if the current approach proves unworkable.

Again, I think that a professional and productive dialog such as this is a great way to further improve the Navy that we all love and serve.


Anonymous said...

Thank you, Mr. Cooley.

I appreciate this exchange.

Fully agree that cyber presents a different situation. My rub is with the operational control authority designation for cryptology, EW and IO. Discussed it in an earlier submission that Mike posted so no need to go over it again.

At one time I agreed with the idea of NAVCYBERFOR (and NNWC before that) being a TYCOM under FCC. By the time of its 2010 establishment, however, it was too late to have CYBERFOR become a TYCOM directly (solely) supporting FCC. Mission creep had started. In 2008, NNWC (as the TYCOM) was designated the Fleet Intelligence TYCOM, putting the scope of responsibilities beyond the MF&T of FCC/10FLT.

Fast forward to today and the opportunity to align the TYCOM under FCC is lost without making major changes. Renaming NAVCYBER to NAVIDFOR included establishment of supporting relationships with ONI and NAVMETOCCOM. All of that would have to be undone if NAVIDFOR was to become the TYCOM supporting the lean and mean operations of FCC/10FLT. Not saying it couldn't happen. Depends on if leadership is either willing to take another/continuing shot at getting it right or wants to let it lie for a while to see what happens.

As for putting this kind of information up the chain of command, I'm in the wrong organization to make an impact. I'm hoping the the right staffies are reading this blog so, at minimum, they're getting food for thought.

Mike Lambert: Thank you for allowing this exchange to continue on your blog site. There needs to be a venue for this kind of discussion.

Chuck said...

There is a venue over at Station HYPO. Come join us!

Anonymous said...

Thanks, Chuck.

I admit that the second part of my comment to Mike Lambert was intended to get a response from Station HYPO. I'm not contributing to that site, yet, for two reasons:

1. I haven't been able to crack the code for posting comments. It appears I have to have an account with one of the Profiles. Could be that I don't understand the process and need educated. This site is much more user-friendly -- I can submit as Anonymous and Mike decides if he wants to post my comment. I understand why he went to that process, too, because he was getting some very unprofessional comments through the auto-post.

2. There's been very little posted on HYPO that would have drawn a response from me. The byline is Celebrating the past, present, and future of Naval Cryptology. Up until recently, almost everything has been the past. It's interesting, but... I see hope for 2016 with the resolutions. We'll see if it lives up to its own challenge.

Getting back to my comment to Mike, I truly do appreciate the work he put into this site and his willingness to keep it going, even if it's just a bit now. I didn't always agree with the types of postings he did but that was his prerogative. However, he also didn't hesitate to post somewhat controversial topics that sparked good debate, along with the typical pot shots.

Standing-by, Chuck. I do have a bit of an itch to get into discussions about the Cryptologic Community Foundational Principles.

Thanks, again, Mike.

Chuck said...


The team chose to not allow anonymous comments. I agree with that choice.

Regarding content, there is a subtle difference in our site compared to Mike's. ALL of us on the team are (1) currently serving Naval Officers (AC/RC) and (2) identified by name. While there will be critical comments (my last post about our name was directed at our Flag leadership) there won't be pot shots or unprofessional content.

Happy to host you as a guest writer to share some of your thoughts. As you can see by looking at the site, we (the team) have differing opinions as well.



AO C10F said...

This will all be fixed with the name change. No worries, mate.