Proceedings Magazine - November 2014… by Vice Admiral Ted N.
Branch, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence/Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Information Dominance
(See Masters or Jacks? by H. Stephenson, pp. 58–63, October
2014 Proceedings)
I want to thank Commander Stephenson for his recent article,
which outlined his views on aspects of the Navy’s approach to developing
information dominance (ID) as a fourth warfighting pillar, alongside air,
surface, and undersea warfare. I welcome the continued dialogue in Proceedings
on these issues that I think are important to the Information Dominance Corps
(IDC) and to the Navy as a whole.
Commander Stephenson is concerned that cross-detailing
officers in the IDC might somehow diminish the specialized skills and abilities
these officers possess and currently provide. I see cross-detailing as quite
the opposite—an opportunity to capitalize on their specialized knowledge while
at the same time broadening their portfolio by exposing them to the full range
of ID capabilities and perspectives in order to maximize operational advantages
and warfighting efforts. My intent in cross-detailing officers (i.e., detailing
them to billets traditionally filled by officers from other IDC disciplines) is
to more deeply professionalize the IDC by developing an acute awareness of all
IDC capabilities among professionals who are already master practitioners of
their respective disciplines.
This approach is not unique to the IDC; it is used by other
communities to develop a similarly broadened perspective in their officers.
Strengthening the interdisciplinary nature of the IDC is vital to adapting
successfully to the evolving complexity of the future warfighting environment.
Our Navy would be ill-served by perpetuating single-discipline solutions to
increasingly complex information dominance/warfare problem sets. This approach
is supported by years of academic research that points to the value of
interdisciplinary education and research.
With respect to the role of ID within the existing Composite
Warfare Commander construct, it is still a moving target. While we are working
with the Fleet to help define the optimum organizational construct for ID
afloat, that structure will ultimately be determined by the Fleet, not the Chief
of Naval Operations staff in the Pentagon. It will evolve over time, through
trial and error and operational stress, much as the current construct has
evolved and continues to evolve today.
Commander Stephenson’s concern that the maturing role of ID afloat
will distance intelligence officers from their commanders is unfounded. Having
served as a warfighting commander, I’m confident that no commander will allow
any organizational construct, particularly one under his or her direct control,
to keep them from the intelligence (or any other discipline’s information) they
might need to make critical warfighting decisions. Commanders are hungry for
interdisciplinary perspectives that shape and deliver a wide range of kinetic
and non-kinetic options.
One additional point: Commander Stephenson unduly constrains
the impact of ID capabilities by asserting that their effects are limited to
the non-kinetic realm. In fact, they contribute to or directly provide effects
that go far beyond the electromagnetic spectrum. Navy Integrated Fire
Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) is a prime example.
The Navy needs its IDC leaders to possess both a great depth
of expertise in a specific discipline and a wide breadth of experience across
ID and the other warfighting disciplines. This is all about warfighting. The
complexity of today’s threats demands us to be both masters and jacks, and that
is what we in the IDC will deliver to the Navy.
(Note: The Masters or Jacks article was reproduced in the
Monday, 10 November 2014 Information Dominance News Clips)