Share it.
Don't know if it's a great idea? Share it anyway.
Be generous. Share a lot.
Don't be afraid.
If it turns out to be a stupid idea, say it was mine. No harm done.
Wednesday, April 30, 2014
Got a great idea?
Share it.
Don't know if it's a great idea? Share it anyway.
Be generous. Share a lot.
Don't be afraid.
If it turns out to be a stupid idea, say it was mine. No harm done.
Monday, April 28, 2014
Shining eyes
One way to check whether you're doing an adequate job is to look in your Sailors' eyes. The eyes never lie. If the eyes are shining, then you know that your leadership is working. Sailors in the presence of possibility react physically as well as emotionally. If the eyes aren’t shining, you ask yourself, “What am I doing that’s keeping my Sailors’ eyes from shining?” That question also works for the transformation of the dominating father — “What kind of a parent am I being that my children’s eyes aren’t shining?” — or the dominating teacher, or the dominating manager.
Benjamin Zander of the Boston Philharmonic - paraphrased for the Navy
Sunday, April 27, 2014
Ethics Problem in the Navy?
“I don’t think we have an ethics problem across the Navy. But I think we need to reinforce our core values and our core commitment to that… Integrity is the foundation of what we’re about. We need to talk about that – it needs to be part of our training program. I’m not just talking about General Military Training, we need to talk about it in the ready rooms, we need to talk about it on the bridge of our ships, we need to talk about it on our squadron flight lines, in the hangar bay and in our bilges…"
Chief of Naval Operations - Admiral Jonathan Greenert
Saturday, April 26, 2014
How did this happen??
You didn't keep your word to your Sailors. You never backed up the Department Head like you promised her you would. You didn't turn your Sailors' evals in on time. The awards you promised to write are still in your INBOX. You never made it to command PT. Your Chiefs Mess is out of control. Sailors' families have NEVER heard from you. Standards were never met. Standards were never explained. Deadlines passed you like Audis on the autobahn. You wore your uniform like you didn't care that you were serving with some of the best Sailors at the best command in the Navy.
And, you wonder why the Sailors don't come to you for help! You can't seem to help yourself. Pull yourself together Shipmate and be the kind of leader you were meant to be. Be the kind of leader your Sailors deserve. Get back into the circle of trust.
Friday, April 25, 2014
Vive La Truth
During times of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act.
~ George Orwell
Thursday, April 24, 2014
April is National Letter Writing Month
Writing, sending and receiving letters, postcards, and greeting cards is
a tradition that has
preserved our nation's history and has changed lives-particularly in
times of war and times of personal triumph and tragedy. Unlike other
communications, card and letter writing is timeless,
personal, and immediately tangible.
Wednesday, April 23, 2014
Notable Quotable - Center for Information Dominance Corry Station
 |
| Captain Cerovsky congratulates CID's newest Chief Petty Officers |
“Our Center for Information Dominance (CID) instructors are the reason why CID continues to produce the world’s finest
information dominance warriors,” Captain Susan K. Cerovsky (Commanding Officer) said. “When our graduates leave here,
they are fully prepared to join the fleet and to perform their mission, thanks
to the hard work by these first-rate instructors.”
Tuesday, April 22, 2014
New Information Warfare Captain Selections
Tyrone Ward 0001
Bryan Braswell 0002
Todd Gagnon 0003
Bill Kramer 0004
Vane Rhead 0005
Pete Giangrasso 0006
Boz Offord 0007
Sean Cooney 0008
Julia Slattery 0009
Mike Riggins 0010
Monday, April 21, 2014
Sunday, April 20, 2014
Christ is RISEN - Leadership Secrets of Jesus Christ - Happy Easter
1. Jesus was a problem solver.
2. Jesus believed in His product.
3. Jesus never misrepresented His product.
4. Jesus went where the people were.
5. Jesus took time to rest.
6. Jesus took time to plan.
7. Jesus knew He did not have to close every sale.
8. Jesus had something others needed.
9. Jesus was concerned about people’s finances.
10. Jesus was willing to go where He had never been.
11. Jesus never allowed what others said about Him to changes His opinion of Himself.
12. Jesus understood timing and preparation.
13. Jesus developed a passion for His goals.
14. Jesus respected authority.
15. Jesus never discriminated.
16. Jesus offered incentives.
17. Jesus overcame the stigma of a questionable past.
18. Jesus never wasted time answering critics.
19. Jesus knew there was a right time and a wrong time to approach people.
20. Jesus educated those He mentored.
21. Jesus refused to be discouraged when others misjudged His motives.
22. Jesus refused to be bitter when others were disloyal or betrayed Him.
23. Jesus networked with people of all backgrounds.
24. Jesus resisted temptation.
25. Jesus made decisions that created a desired future instead of a desired present.
26. Jesus never judged people by their outward appearance.
27. Jesus recognized the law of redemption.
28. Jesus was a tomorrow thinker.
29. Jesus knew that money alone could not bring contentment.
30. Jesus knew the power of words and the power of silence.
31. Jesus knew when you want something you have never had,
you have to do something you have never done.
you have to do something you have never done.
32. Jesus permitted others to correct their mistakes.
33. Jesus knew His worth.
34. Jesus never tried to succeed alone.
35. Jesus knew that money is anywhere you really want it to be.
36. Jesus set specific goals.
37. Jesus knew that every great achievement requires a willingness to begin small.
38. Jesus hurt when others hurt.
39. Jesus was not afraid to show His feelings.
40. Jesus knew the power of habit.
41. Jesus finished what He started.
42. Jesus was knowledgeable of scripture.
43. Jesus never hurried.
44. Jesus went where he was celebrated instead of where He was tolerated.
45. Jesus constantly consulted His heavenly father.
46. Jesus knew that prayer generates results.
47. Jesus rose early.
48. Jesus never felt He had to prove Himself to anyone.
49. Jesus avoided unnecessary confrontations.
50. Jesus delegated.
51. Jesus carefully guarded His personal schedule.
52. Jesus asked questions to accurately determine the needs and desires of others.From - The Leadership Secrets of Jesus by Mike Murdock; published by Honor Books, Tulsa OK; 1996
Saturday, April 19, 2014
Command excellence
"Be a yardstick of quality. Some people aren't used to an environment where excellence is expected."
Attributed to Steve Jobs and dozens of Navy Command Excellence proponents.
Attributed to Steve Jobs and dozens of Navy Command Excellence proponents.
Friday, April 18, 2014
NIOC HAWAII SAILOR IS CNO SHORE SAILOR OF THE YEAR
140418-N-IV546-034 WASHINGTON (April 18, 2014) Cryptologic Technician 1st Class Patricia H. Madigan receives a Navy-Marine Corps commendation medal from Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mark E. Ferguson III after winning the 2013 Navy Shore Sailor of the Year (SOY) competition at the Pentagon. The Navy Shore SOY program was established in 1972 to recognize Sailors who represent the best of the Navy by demonstrating both professional and personal dedication above and beyond their peers. This year's competition was among 5 first class petty officers representing shore commands across the entire fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Thomas L. Rosprim/ Released)
Thursday, April 17, 2014
This will change things
Next for
intelligence:
immersion
Apr. 15, 2014 - 03:45AM |
By | AMBER CORRIN | DEFENSE NEWS
The intelligence community is pushing toward a new, more comprehensive way of collecting, processing and using the data that underpins all of its operations: an experience built around immersion that fluidly helps connect the dots between entities that once functioned in silos.
At the center of the movement is the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, whose director, Letitia Long, says is at the center of transforming the way the government handles intelligence.
“By immersion I mean living, interacting and experimenting with the data in a multimedia, multisensory experience with GEOINT at its core,” Long said April 15 at the GEOINT conference in Tampa, Fla. “Immersion will break down the barriers between collectors, analysts, customers and decision-makers.”
At the center of the movement to the next generation of intelligence, Long said that getting to immersion means that NGA must complete a transformation from static provider of products to a resource for dynamic GEOINT content, analysis and services.
Long said that transition hinges on six pillars on which NGA will build its new-look intelligence operations: its multi-source content backbone Map of the World; analytic capabilities; next-generation collection; the globe; open-information technology; and research and technology.
“Ultimately the pillars bring to bear the power of GEOINT, to discover the unknown and deliver faster, more predictive insights to decision-makers,” she said.
Tuesday, April 15, 2014
Add Value
Practice adding value to Sailors. As you move up in your Navy career, more and more of your responsibility lies in Sailor development. Ask yourself, "What can I do to add value to my Sailors? What can I do to help them become better Sailors and better people?" Remember to bring out the best in a Sailor, you have to visualize that Sailor at his/her best.
Monday, April 14, 2014
Remembering the tragic shootdown of Deep Sea 129 and the loss of 31 Shipmates
Flight of Deep Sea 129
Beggar Shadow mission
At
07:00 local time (TOKYO) of Tuesday, 15 April 1969, an EC-121M of the U.S.
Navy's Fleet Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (VQ-1) took off from Atsugi,
on an intelligence-gathering reconnaissance mission.
The aircraft, Bureau number 135749, c/n 4316, bore the tail code "PR-21" and used the radio call sign Deep Sea 129. Aboard were 8 officers and 23 enlisted men under the command of LCDR James Overstreet. Nine of the crew, including one Marine were Naval Security Group cryptologic technicians (CTs) and linguists in Russian and Korean.
Deep Sea 129's assigned task was a routine nationally tasked BEGGAR SHADOW signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection mission. Its flight profile northwest over the Sea of Japan took it to an area offshore of Musu Point, where the EC-121M would turn northeast toward the Soviet Union and orbit along a 120-nautical-mile (222 km) long elliptical track. These missions, while nominally under the command of SEVENTH Fleet and CINCPAC, were actually controlled operationally by the Naval Security Group detachment at NSF Kamiseya, Japan, under the direction of the National Security Agency.
LCDR Overstreet's orders included a prohibition from approaching closer than 50 nautical miles (90 km) to the North Korean coast. VQ-1 had flown the route and orbit for two years, and the mission had been graded as being of "minimal risk." During the first three months of 1969 nearly 200 similar missions had been flown by both Navy and U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft off North Korea's east coast without incident.
The mission was tracked by a series of security agencies within the Department of Defense that were pre-briefed on the mission, including land-based Air Force radars in Japan and South Korea. The USAF 6918th Security Squadron at Hakata Air Station, USAF 6988th Security Squadron at Yokota Air Base, and Detachment 1, 6922nd Security Wing at Osan Air Base monitored the North Korean reaction by intercepting its air defense search radar transmissions. The Army Security Agency communications interception station at Osan listened to North Korean air defense radio traffic, and the Naval Security Group at Kamiseya, which provided the seven of the nine CTs aboard Deep Sea 129, also intercepted Soviet Air Force search radars.
At 12:34 local time, roughly six hours into the mission, the Army Security Agency and radars in Korea detected the takeoff of two North Korean Air Force MiG-17s and tracked them, assuming that they were responding in some fashion to the mission of Deep Sea 129. In the meantime the EC-121 filed a scheduled activity report by radio on time at 13:00 and did not indicate anything out of the ordinary. 22 minutes later the radars lost the picture of the MiGs and did not reacquire it until 13:37, closing with Deep Sea 129 for a probable intercept.
The communications that this activity generated within the National Security network was monitored by the EC-121's parent unit, VQ-1, which at 13:44 sent Deep Sea 129 a "Condition 3" alert by radio, indicating it might be under attack. LCDR Overstreet acknowledged the warning and complied with procedures to abort the mission and return to base. At 13:47 the radar tracks of the MiGs merged with that of Deep Sea 129, which disappeared from the radar picture two minutes later.
At first none of the agencies were alarmed, since procedures also dictated that the EC-121 rapidly descend below radar coverage, and Overstreet had not transmitted that he was under attack. However when it did not reappear within ten minutes, VQ-1 requested a scramble of two Air Force Convair F-102A Delta Dart interceptors to provide combat air patrol for the EC-121.
By 14:20 the Army Security Agency post had become increasingly concerned. It first sent a FLASH message (a high priority intelligence message to be sent within six minutes) indicating that Deep Sea 129 had disappeared, and then at 14:44, an hour after the shoot-down, sent a CRITIC ("critical intelligence") message (the highest message priority, to be processed and sent within two minutes) to six addressees within the National Command Authority, including President Richard M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.
A search and rescue effort was immediately launched by VQ-1 using aircraft of both the U.S. Air Force and Navy. The first response was by an Air Force Lockheed HC-130 Hercules, with a Boeing KC-135A Stratotanker tanker in support and an escort of fighters, but the search effort rapidly expanded to a total of 26 aircraft. At short notice, two U.S. Navy destroyers, USS Henry W. Tucker and USS Dale, sailed from Sasebo, Japan, on the afternoon of April 15 toward the area of last contact (41°28′00″N 131°35′00″E / 41.4666667°N 131.5833333°E), a position approximately 90 nautical miles (167 km) off the North Korean port of Ch'ŏngjin.
The first debris sighting occurred at 09:30 the next morning, 16 April, by a Navy VP-40 P-3B Orion aircraft. Two destroyers of the Soviet Navy #429 Kotlin Class and #580 Kashin Class were directed to the scene by the Navy aircraft. The Air Force HC-130 SAR aircraft, that relieved the P-3B, dropped the Soviet ships URC-10 survival radios and eventually made voice contact in the afternoon as the Soviet craft were departing. Both Soviet ships indicated they had recovered debris from the aircraft but had not found any indication of survivors. That evening Tucker arrived in the area and after midnight recovered part of the aircraft perforated with shrapnel damage.
At approximately noon of 17 April Tucker recovered the first of two crewmen's bodies, then rendezvoused with the Soviet destroyer Vdokhnovenny (D-429) and sent over her whaleboat. The Soviets turned over all of the debris they had collected. The bodies of Lt.j.g. Joseph R. Ribar and AT1 Richard E. Sweeney were taken to Japan but those of the other 29 crewmen were not recovered.
North Korea publicly announced that it had shot down the plane, claiming it had violated its territorial airspace. The U.S. government acknowledged that it was conducting a search for a missing aircraft but stated that it had explicit orders to remain at least 50 nautical miles (93 km) offshore. Of note, April 15 was the 57th birthday of the North Korean dictator Kim Il-Sung.
From WIKIPEDIA
Those lost include:
The aircraft, Bureau number 135749, c/n 4316, bore the tail code "PR-21" and used the radio call sign Deep Sea 129. Aboard were 8 officers and 23 enlisted men under the command of LCDR James Overstreet. Nine of the crew, including one Marine were Naval Security Group cryptologic technicians (CTs) and linguists in Russian and Korean.
Deep Sea 129's assigned task was a routine nationally tasked BEGGAR SHADOW signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection mission. Its flight profile northwest over the Sea of Japan took it to an area offshore of Musu Point, where the EC-121M would turn northeast toward the Soviet Union and orbit along a 120-nautical-mile (222 km) long elliptical track. These missions, while nominally under the command of SEVENTH Fleet and CINCPAC, were actually controlled operationally by the Naval Security Group detachment at NSF Kamiseya, Japan, under the direction of the National Security Agency.
LCDR Overstreet's orders included a prohibition from approaching closer than 50 nautical miles (90 km) to the North Korean coast. VQ-1 had flown the route and orbit for two years, and the mission had been graded as being of "minimal risk." During the first three months of 1969 nearly 200 similar missions had been flown by both Navy and U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft off North Korea's east coast without incident.
The mission was tracked by a series of security agencies within the Department of Defense that were pre-briefed on the mission, including land-based Air Force radars in Japan and South Korea. The USAF 6918th Security Squadron at Hakata Air Station, USAF 6988th Security Squadron at Yokota Air Base, and Detachment 1, 6922nd Security Wing at Osan Air Base monitored the North Korean reaction by intercepting its air defense search radar transmissions. The Army Security Agency communications interception station at Osan listened to North Korean air defense radio traffic, and the Naval Security Group at Kamiseya, which provided the seven of the nine CTs aboard Deep Sea 129, also intercepted Soviet Air Force search radars.
At 12:34 local time, roughly six hours into the mission, the Army Security Agency and radars in Korea detected the takeoff of two North Korean Air Force MiG-17s and tracked them, assuming that they were responding in some fashion to the mission of Deep Sea 129. In the meantime the EC-121 filed a scheduled activity report by radio on time at 13:00 and did not indicate anything out of the ordinary. 22 minutes later the radars lost the picture of the MiGs and did not reacquire it until 13:37, closing with Deep Sea 129 for a probable intercept.
The communications that this activity generated within the National Security network was monitored by the EC-121's parent unit, VQ-1, which at 13:44 sent Deep Sea 129 a "Condition 3" alert by radio, indicating it might be under attack. LCDR Overstreet acknowledged the warning and complied with procedures to abort the mission and return to base. At 13:47 the radar tracks of the MiGs merged with that of Deep Sea 129, which disappeared from the radar picture two minutes later.
At first none of the agencies were alarmed, since procedures also dictated that the EC-121 rapidly descend below radar coverage, and Overstreet had not transmitted that he was under attack. However when it did not reappear within ten minutes, VQ-1 requested a scramble of two Air Force Convair F-102A Delta Dart interceptors to provide combat air patrol for the EC-121.
By 14:20 the Army Security Agency post had become increasingly concerned. It first sent a FLASH message (a high priority intelligence message to be sent within six minutes) indicating that Deep Sea 129 had disappeared, and then at 14:44, an hour after the shoot-down, sent a CRITIC ("critical intelligence") message (the highest message priority, to be processed and sent within two minutes) to six addressees within the National Command Authority, including President Richard M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.
A search and rescue effort was immediately launched by VQ-1 using aircraft of both the U.S. Air Force and Navy. The first response was by an Air Force Lockheed HC-130 Hercules, with a Boeing KC-135A Stratotanker tanker in support and an escort of fighters, but the search effort rapidly expanded to a total of 26 aircraft. At short notice, two U.S. Navy destroyers, USS Henry W. Tucker and USS Dale, sailed from Sasebo, Japan, on the afternoon of April 15 toward the area of last contact (41°28′00″N 131°35′00″E / 41.4666667°N 131.5833333°E), a position approximately 90 nautical miles (167 km) off the North Korean port of Ch'ŏngjin.
The first debris sighting occurred at 09:30 the next morning, 16 April, by a Navy VP-40 P-3B Orion aircraft. Two destroyers of the Soviet Navy #429 Kotlin Class and #580 Kashin Class were directed to the scene by the Navy aircraft. The Air Force HC-130 SAR aircraft, that relieved the P-3B, dropped the Soviet ships URC-10 survival radios and eventually made voice contact in the afternoon as the Soviet craft were departing. Both Soviet ships indicated they had recovered debris from the aircraft but had not found any indication of survivors. That evening Tucker arrived in the area and after midnight recovered part of the aircraft perforated with shrapnel damage.
At approximately noon of 17 April Tucker recovered the first of two crewmen's bodies, then rendezvoused with the Soviet destroyer Vdokhnovenny (D-429) and sent over her whaleboat. The Soviets turned over all of the debris they had collected. The bodies of Lt.j.g. Joseph R. Ribar and AT1 Richard E. Sweeney were taken to Japan but those of the other 29 crewmen were not recovered.
North Korea publicly announced that it had shot down the plane, claiming it had violated its territorial airspace. The U.S. government acknowledged that it was conducting a search for a missing aircraft but stated that it had explicit orders to remain at least 50 nautical miles (93 km) offshore. Of note, April 15 was the 57th birthday of the North Korean dictator Kim Il-Sung.
From WIKIPEDIA
Those lost include:
Lcdr. James H. Overstreet, Lt. John N. Dzema, Lt. Dennis B. Gleason, Lt. Peter P. Perrottey, Lt. John H. Singer, Lt. Robert F. Taylor, Ltjg. Joseph R. Ribar, Ltjg. Robert J. Sykora, Ltjg. Norman E. Wilkerson, ADRC Marshall H. McNamara, CTC Frederick A. Randall, CTC Richard E. Smith, AT1 Richard E. Sweeney, AT1 James Leroy Roach, CT1 John H. Potts, ADR1 Ballard F. Conners, AT1 Stephen C. Chartier, AT1 Bernie J. Colgin, ADR2 Louis F. Balderman, ATR2 Dennis J. Horrigan, ATN2 Richard H. Kincaid, ATR2 Timothy H. McNeil, CT2 Stephen J. Tesmer, ATN3 David M. Willis, CT3 Philip D. Sundby, AMS3 Richard T. Prindle, CT3 John A. Miller, AE3 LaVerne A. Greiner, ATN3 Gene K. Graham, CT3 Gary R. DuCharme, SSGT Hugh M. Lynch,(US Marine Corps).
REST IN PEACE
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